Dividend cuts, firm profitability and financial characteristics by ap Gwilym, Owain et al.
  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Papers in 
Accounting and Finance 
   
 
Dividend Cuts, Firm Profitability & Financial Characteristics 
 
 
Owain ap Gwilym 
University of Wales 
 
 
James Seaton, 
University of Southampton 
 
 
Stephen Thomas 
University of Southampton 
 
 
 
 
 
Number AF04-18 
April 2004                  ISSN 1356-3548 
 
   2 
 
 
Dividend Cuts, Firm Profitability & Financial 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
Owain ap Gwilym, 
University of Wales, 
School of Management & Business, 
Penglais, 
Aberystwyth, 
UK. 
 
 
James Seaton, 
School of Management, 
University of Southampton, 
Highfield, 
Southampton, 
UK. 
 
 
Stephen Thomas*, 
School of Management, 
University of Southampton, 
Highfield, 
Southampton, 
UK. 
 
* Corresponding author 
Tel: (023) 8059 3068 
Fax: (023) 8059 3844 
e-mail: sthomas@socsci.soton.ac.uk 
 
 
 
This version: 13
th April 2004  3 
ABSTRACT 
 
   This paper investigates the dividend decisions of firms in the UK reporting losses 
after sustained periods of profitability. It is found that loss-making firms are more 
likely to reduce dividends compared to firms that remain profitable, although a loss is 
far from a guarantee that the dividend payment will be reduced. A lower propensity to 
reduce dividends is found in the UK relative to the US, consistent with the stronger 
culture of dividend payments. The size of the loss is an important factor in a firm’s 
dividend policy. However, this is mitigated to some extent if it is the result of unusual 
accounting  items  because  managers  view  these  as  a  temporary  fluctuation  in 
profitability.  Leverage  is  found  to  have  some  role  in  the  dividend  decision,  with 
higher  levels  of  debt  consistent  with  a  greater  likelihood  of  a  reduction  in  the 
distribution whilst also suppressing profitability in future years. Profit margins prior 
to the loss year are also a significant factor in dividend policy whereby low margin 
firms  are  more  likely  to  cut  dividends.  4 
   Despite being the two most heavily researched stock markets in the world, the US 
and UK have notable differences in dividend cultures, with the former having lower 
average  dividend  yields
1  and  a  higher  proportion  of  non-dividend  paying  stocks. 
Recent  studies  by  Fama  and  French  (2001)  and  Benito  and  Young  (2001)  have 
documented a decline in dividend payers in both the US and the UK respectively. 
Furthermore, they describe the characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers, both 
former payers and firms that have never paid a dividend. Benito and Young (2001) 
take  the  additional  step  of  considering  the  differences  between  firms  that  cut 
dividends and firms that omit dividend payments. We further extend this comparison 
by examining the dividend decisions of companies that have a considerable history of 
both profitability and dividend payments, but that then incur a downturn in earnings 
or a loss. Of particular interest is the dividend decision made by firms in the initial 
loss period. Are managers reluctant to cut dividends, viewing the loss as a temporary 
phenomenon, or do they act decisively by reducing the dividend to preserve the firm’s 
cash resources? 
 
   DeAngelo et al (1992) used US data for 1980-85 to investigate the dividend policy 
of  firms  that  reported  a  poor  earnings  performance  after  sustained  dividend 
distributions  and  profitability.  They  cite  work  by  Miller  and  Modigliani  (1961), 
arguing that dividend changes for firms with a track record of profitability can be 
more  reliably  viewed  as  a  significant  change  in  dividend  policy  rather  than  a 
continuation of previous policy. DeAngelo et al (1992) discovered that around half of 
all firms with ten or more year’s prior positive dividends and earnings cut dividends 
in the initial loss year. This compared to just 1% of non-loss firms cutting dividends. 
They  find  that  analysing  the  unusual  accounting  items accompanying  bottom  line   5 
earnings is able to explain more of the dividend decisions by firms. An exceptional 
item is viewed as having only a transitory impact on profitability and thus a dividend 
reduction is less likely. This finding is particularly important given that Collins et al 
(1997)  document  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  US  between  1953-93  in  both  the 
percentage of firms reporting unusual items and the size of the items relative to net 
income. 
 
   Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) investigate the existence of earnings management by 
US firms to both avoid earnings decreases and losses. They discover that earnings 
changes of just below zero occur less frequently than would be expected relative to 
increases slightly greater than zero. Furthermore, far fewer observations of overall 
earnings just below zero are recorded relative to expectations than is the case for 
slightly positive earnings. They argue that earnings management to avoid losses is 
both pervasive and economically significant. This is consistent with Hayn (1995), 
who  suggests  that  firms  whose  earnings  are  expected  to  be  marginally  negative 
partake in earnings management to help them into positive territory. Degeorge et al 
(1999) report a hierarchy for earnings; managers attach most importance to avoiding 
losses,  the  emphasis  then  moves  to  achieving  increases  in  quarterly  earnings  and 
finally to beating analysts’ forecasts. Barth et al (1999) find that firms with a history 
of sustained earnings growth are valued at higher multiples of earnings than firms 
without such a track record. The multiples increase almost monotonically with the 
number  of  years  of  consistent  growth,  providing  managers  with  an  incentive  to 
smooth earnings. In summary, this literature implies that previously profitable firms 
will do their utmost to avoid having to report losses. Further, those firms that do 
report  losses  will  have  clearly  experienced  a  genuinely  disappointing  earnings   6 
performance. This makes a firm’s dividend decision surrounding a reported loss of 
particular interest. 
 
   If dividend policy reflects managers’ views of profitability then there is a possibility 
that this can be used to predict future earnings. Lintner (1956) finds that dividends are 
only increased when management believes that earnings have permanently increased. 
Modigliani and Miller (1959) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) hypothesize that a 
dividend cut is indicative that future earnings are likely to be disappointing. Watts 
(1973) found evidence of a positive relationship between current dividends and future 
earnings for 310 firms for the period 1946-1967, but the statistical significance of 
these results was very low. Healy and Palepu (1988) discovered that firms initiating 
dividend  payments  experienced  rapidly  increasing  earnings  both  prior  to  the  first 
dividend and for two years afterwards. However, for firms omitting dividends they 
find that earnings decline in the year of the omission but then increase substantially in 
future years. This is the opposite of the informational content of dividends hypothesis. 
DeAngelo et al (1992) find that a dividend cut is a significant factor in improving the 
ability to predict future earnings using current earnings. This holds despite the use of 
different earnings measures such as operating income, operating cash flow or the use 
of net income combined with unusual accounting items. Bernatzi et al (1997) discover 
that firms that cut dividends have experienced declining earnings in both the year of 
the cut and in the previous year also. Consistent with Healy and Palepu (1988), they 
find that earnings significantly increase in the year after the dividend cut. However, it 
is noted that firms that raise dividends are less likely to experience a future earnings 
decline compared to firms that merely maintain dividends. Skinner (2004) reports that   7 
the relationship between current earnings and future earnings is stronger for dividend 
paying firms than for non-paying firms, particularly for large dividend payers. 
 
   Fama and French (2001) document a substantial decline in the incidence of dividend 
paying  non-financial, non-utility (industrial) firms. The proportion of ‘payers’ fell 
from 66% in 1978 to just 21% in 2000. They attribute this to a combination of, a 
decline in the number of firms possessing the characteristics of dividend payers and, a 
decline in the propensity of industrials to pay dividends irrespective of the firm’s 
characteristics. DeAngelo et al (2002) also find a decline in payers similar to Fama 
and French (2001), but they point out that aggregate dividends have actually increased 
in real terms between 1978 and 2000. This is due to large payers becoming larger, 
whilst many small payers have been lost from the sample. Evidence from the UK 
presented by Benito and Young (2001) and ap Gwilym et al (2004) shows that the 
culture of dividend payments by firms is very different to the US. The proportion of 
dividend paying non-financials in 1979 was around 95%. This declined over the next 
two decades, but was still over 70% in 1999. 
 
   Given  the  significant differences  between the  UK  and  US  in  terms  of  dividend 
payers, and also the decline in payers generally in the last twenty years or so, it seems 
reasonable to reassess some of the previous findings between dividends and earnings. 
This paper applies the methodology of DeAngelo et al (1992) to a UK context over a 
different period of time. Given that their original period of study (1980-85) was close 
to a peak in dividend payments, and also of a relatively short time frame compared to 
other studies, the reporting of similar findings using a different epoch, in a different 
country, when conditions appear to have materially changed would represent strong   8 
corroboration of their findings. Furthermore, we extend DeAngelo et al’s (1992) study 
to incorporate a range of additional variables that could influence manager’s dividend 
decisions. 
 
   Fama and French (2001) find that firms that formerly paid dividends have a greater 
ratio of liabilities to assets than dividend paying firms. Benito and Young (2001) also 
describe  that  higher  leverage  is  associated  with  dividend  reduction  and  omission. 
Given these results it appears appropriate to consider debt as a variable that may 
improve the ability to explain dividend decisions amongst previously profitable firms. 
Both short-term liabilities and the overall indebtedness of firms are considered. 
 
   Barbee et al (1996) suggest that annual sales may be a more reliable indicator of a 
firm’s long-term profitability than earnings. They ascribe this to earnings being more 
variable due to temporary occurrences, e.g. short-term pricing policies. Senchack and 
Martin  (1987)  also  make  the  point  that  sales  are  less  likely  to  be  affected  by 
accounting discrepancies than earnings. With this in mind, changes in sales are also 
investigated in terms of dividend policy along with profit margins on sales. 
 
   In anticipation of our results, it is discovered that losses are an important factor in 
the UK for dividend reductions, with far fewer cuts being made by profitable firms. A 
loss  does  not  guarantee  a  dividend  cut  though,  with  less  than  one-third  of  firms 
reducing dividends in the initial loss year. A lower propensity to reduce dividends is 
found in the UK relative to the US, consistent with the stronger culture of dividend 
payments. The magnitude of the loss is found to be relevant to the dividend decision, 
with  large  losses  increasing  the  propensity  of  firms  to  cut  dividends.  Unusual   9 
accounting  items  decrease  the  probability  of  a dividend  reduction  since  managers 
view these as being temporary factors in depressing profits and that reversion to more 
normal  levels  is  expected  in  the  future.  Leverage  is  also  linked  to  the  dividend 
decision and, consistent with Benito and Young (2001), higher indebtedness raises the 
prospect of a dividend cut. Finally, in terms of dividend policy, profit margins on 
turnover are found to be a significant factor both prior to the loss year, and in the loss 
year itself, with lower margins being associated with more dividend reductions. 
 
   Some evidence is found that dividend reductions are a sign that future earnings will 
be lower than for non-reducers, although the statistical significance of these findings 
is  quite  low.  However  we  do  find  an  earnings  rebound  after  a  loss  for  dividend 
reducing firms consistent with Healy and Palepu (1988), amongst others. Finally, the 
overall debt position of the firm is linked to future profitability, with high debt levels 
suppressing profitability in future years. 
 
   The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section I describes the data sources 
used  in  the  study,  the  sample  selection  criteria  and  the  methodology  employed. 
Section II compares the dividend policy of firms that are loss making with those that 
remain profitable. It also relates the decision to reduce dividends to losses, earnings 
and changes in profitability. Section III considers the magnitude of losses of dividend 
reducers compared to those firms that do not cut dividends. Section IV investigates 
the impact of unusual accounting items on dividend policy. Section V looks at debt 
and sales measures as additional factors in explaining dividend decisions amongst 
loss-making firms, while section VI considers the informational content of dividend 
policy in terms of future earnings. Section VII concludes.   10 
 
I. Data and Methodology 
 
   The  methodology  used  in  this  study  is,  where  possible,  consistent  with  that  of 
DeAngelo  et  al  (1992)  for  comparative  purposes.  Most  of  the  study  utilizes  the 
‘primary’ loss sample; this contains non-financial, non-utility (industrial) firms that 
had at least seven consecutive years of positive earnings and dividends prior to the 
initial  loss  year. The firms were  initially identified  using the London  Share Price 
Database (LSPD); the full data set was then obtained for each individual firm from the 
FAME database. In total, the primary sample contains 108 firms that fulfilled the 
earnings and dividends criteria and posted an initial loss during 1996-2000. Firms 
with incomplete track records were not included in the sample. 
 
   To create a standardized time frame for firms in the loss sample, year 0 will be 
deemed to refer to the initial loss year, with the years prior to the loss being denoted 
as a negative value and the years after the loss as positive values (i.e. year –1 is the 
accounting year before the initial loss year and year 1 is the accounting year after the 
initial loss year). Given that the data used is of an annual nature, the calendar year of 
the loss is assumed to be three months after the financial year-end (to allow for the 
preparation of accounts and subsequent dissemination to the market). Thus for firms 
with financial accounting periods ending in January through September, the end of the 
accounting year and the calendar year of the loss will be the same. For firms with a 
financial year-end in October, November or December however, the loss year is the 
subsequent calendar year, e.g. for a financial year-end of 30
th November 1997, the 
loss year is defined as 1998. Throughout this study the profits (losses) for the periods   11 
in question are defined as profits (losses) after exceptional items, interest, taxation, 
extraordinary items and minority interests, but excluding dividends. Any other profit 
measures used, e.g. operating profits, are explicitly stated in the text. DeAngelo et al 
(1992) use income after extraordinary items and discontinued operations in their US 
study as the standard profitability measure. 
 
   The distribution of the 108 firms within the loss sample was found to be relatively 
even across the five years with the following breakdown: 1996, 23 firms; 1997, 21 
firms; 1998, 17 firms; 1999, 27 firms; 2000, 20 firms. No industry was found to be 
excessively dominant in this sample. Using the FTSEA Industry Codes, the largest 
representations were made by business support services with 11 firms and engineering 
(general) with 8 firms. 
 
   The  ‘secondary’  non-loss  sample  was  created  in  the  same  way  as  the  primary, 
however firms must also have had positive earnings throughout the 1996-2000 period 
(firms that delisted or were acquired are still eligible for both samples). Firms are only 
included in the sample after the seven years of previous earnings and dividends have 
been completed. Thus some firms may be in the sample for the full five years whilst 
others may only be in for one year. 
 
   Dividend reductions were initially identified from the LSPD (taking into account 
share-splits). These were  then  individually checked against the  appropriate  annual 
report using LexisNexis. A dividend reduction was classified as a decrease in the total 
dividend paid for the full year. Thus a maintained interim dividend but a reduced final 
dividend would count as a reduction. The total payout for the financial year of the   12 
firm must equal zero for an omission to have occurred. All dividends are compared on 
a basis net of tax since this alleviates any problems relating to the Finance Act 1999.
2 
 
   The  use  of  annual  data  throughout  the  study  is  consistent  with  DeAngelo  et  al 
(1992) and also with Lintner (1956), who found that dividends were considered on an 
annual  basis.  Whilst  every  effort  has  been  made  to  provide  a  comparison  with 
DeAngelo et al (1992), the qualifying period prior to inclusion in both of the samples 
has not remained the same. It was found that a criterion requiring 10 years prior 
positive earnings and dividends did not provide sufficient firms for the primary loss 
sample. This may have been due to a combination of, fewer stocks listed generally in 
the  UK  compared  to the  US  and,  the  decline  in  dividend  paying  firms  described 
earlier. 
 
II. A Comparison between Loss Making and Profitable Firms 
 
   Table  1  shows  the  number  and  proportion  of  dividend  cuts  amongst  both  the 
primary  loss  sample  and  the  secondary  non-loss  sample.  Whilst  there  were  31 
instances  of  dividend  cuts  in  the  loss  sample,  there  were  just  25  in  the  non-loss 
sample. This difference is magnified on a percentage basis to 29% versus only 2%. 
Indeed  11  firms  (10%)  making  an  initial  loss  omitted  dividends  entirely,  whilst 
another 9 firms paid an interim dividend but then omitted the final payment. There 
was, by contrast, just one omission in the non-loss sample. Of the 21 initial dividend 
reductions in the non-loss sample just 3  were made  in the first year of declining 
earnings during 1996-2000. 
   13 
   The evidence presented points to losses being a very significant factor in dividend 
reductions. Given that all the firms considered had been profitable and paid dividends, 
this marked a significant change in policy. The findings are consistent with DeAngelo 
et al (1992), although they found that around half of firms experiencing an initial loss 
cut  their  dividends.  The  lower  propensity  to  cut  distributions  in  the  UK  is  not 
unexpected given the stronger culture of dividend paying relative to the US. 
 
   Table 2 shows that the overall level of earnings is important in dividend decisions. 
Firm years are ranked according to the return on equity (ROE), calculated as the profit 
for the period divided by shareholders’ funds in the previous year. The pooled sample 
shows that the greater the magnitude of the loss in terms of ROE, the more likely a 
dividend reduction is. Of those firms with a ROE of less than –20%, 43.6% of firms 
cut dividends. This compared to 18.8% of firms where the ROE was between 0% and 
-5%. It is also noticeable that the lower the ROE within the profitable firms, the 
greater the propensity to cut dividends that exists. For firms with an ROE between 0% 
and 5% it was found that 7.4% cut dividends, while only 0.6% of companies with an 
ROE  in  excess  of  20%  cut  dividends.  There is  significant  corroboration  with  the 
findings of DeAngelo et al (1992) within these results; the main difference is that they 
find a greater proportion of firms with the lowest negative ROE cut dividends. 
 
   Table 3 provides a logit analysis of firms’ dividend decisions using a pooled sample 
of the 108 firms from the loss sample and 206 firms from the non-loss sample that 
have at least one year of declining profits between 1996 and 2000, but still remain 
positive.  The  dependent  variable  equals  zero  if  the  dividend  is  reduced,  and  one 
otherwise. A loss dummy is included in some specifications; this takes a value of one   14 
if  the  firm  is  a  member  of  the  loss  sample,  and  zero  otherwise.  The  remaining 
independent variables are the profit for the period and the change in profit. Both of 
these variables are standardized by shareholders’ funds in the year prior to the event 
year. 
 
   The loss dummy variable is strongly negative in every specification of the model, 
regardless  of  the  other  variables  used.  It  is  the  most  significant  variable  as  the 
remaining variables lose their statistical significance when included in specifications 
containing the loss dummy. The pseudo R-squared
3 is also greater when comparing 
their  individual  specifications.  Profitability  is  positively  related  to  the  dividend 
decision and thus a smaller loss reduces the chance of a dividend cut. The effect of the 
change in profitability appears less certain though. Whilst strongly positively related 
in the individual specification, it loses its statistical significance when combined with 
profitability and the sign of the coefficient becomes negative. This suggests that much 
of the explanatory power of the change in profitability is encompassed within the 
actual profit level. Given the findings in Tables 1 and 2, it is of little surprise that 
these results are similar to those of DeAngelo et al (1992). 
 
III. The Magnitude of Losses and the Dividend Decision 
 
   Table 4 displays the mean and median levels of standardized earnings in the years 
surrounding  the  event  year  for  dividend  reducers  and  non-reducers  from  the  loss 
sample. The t-statistic, in the rightmost column, tests for equality of the means. In 
year –1 there is a difference of around 2-3% in mean earnings between the more 
profitable non-reducers compared to the less profitable reducers. In the loss year (year   15 
0),  the  gap  expands  considerably  to  around  15%  on  both  the  mean  and  median 
measures. The t-statistic also becomes significant at the 95% level. This result adds 
further weight to the belief that losses are important in dividend setting. 
 
   In year 1, the non-reducers become profitable again, suggesting that managers were 
generally correct in their assessment that the loss was only temporary. Levels of profit 
are still below those prior to the loss however. There is, though, still a considerable 
disparity in profitability compared to those firms that reduced dividends, as evidenced 
by the t-statistic. These are still loss making on a mean basis and barely profitable on 
a median basis. It is noticeable that these reducing firms have still experienced a 
considerable  improvement  in  profitability  compared  to  the  loss  year,  though  this 
improvement continues into year 2 also. This is consistent with the US findings of 
Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo et al (1992) and Bernatzi et al (1997). Even in 
year  2,  however, the  profitability  is  still  low  and  considerably  less  than  the  non-
reducing firms. DeAngelo et al (1992) argue that the dividend reduction reflects low 
levels of profitability not just in the year of the dividend cut but in future years also. 
This is opposed to reflecting year-on-year earnings changes. The evidence presented 
in Table 4 tends to support this conclusion. Perhaps the year-on-year improvement in 
earnings after a dividend reduction is due to managers, having already found that 
trading has been poor for the year and that a cut is inevitable, deciding to bury all the 
bad  news  in  one  year  rather  than  letting  the  problems  persist  into  subsequent 
accounting periods. This could severely depress profits in the year of the dividend 
reduction but  provide  an easy comparable to  surpass the following  year and thus 
prove the firm has ‘turned the corner’. 
   16 
   The summary findings of Table 4 are tested more formally using logit regressions in 
Table 5. As in Table 3, the dependent variable is the dividend decision in year 0. It 
takes the value of zero if a dividend reduction occurred, and one otherwise. Following 
the method of DeAngelo et al (1992), profits in years –1 through +2 (standardized by 
shareholders’  funds  in  year  –1)  are  the  independent  variables  in  the  various 
specifications. 
 
   It is found that profits in the year prior to the loss, whilst positively related to the 
dependent  variable  (i.e.  lower  profits  equals  greater  probability  of  dividend  cut), 
explain very little of the dividend decision and are not statistically significant in any 
of the models. The magnitude of the losses in the event year is again positively related 
to the dividend decision but these are statistically significant in each specification. 
There  is  also  considerable  improvement  in  the  pseudo  R
2  value  following  the 
introduction  of  year  0  losses.  In  the  two  years  following  the  loss  year  there  are 
positive relationships once more with the dividend decision in year 0 but these are 
again not significant. It thus appears that the loss year is the most important variable 
in the dividend decision. DeAngelo et al (1992) find that the loss year is important but 
also the earnings in year 1 are significant, and hence the UK results can offer only 
qualified corroboration in this case. 
 
IV. The Impact of Unusual Accounting Items on Dividend Decisions 
 
   Lintner  (1956)  describes  how  management  increase  dividends  only  when  they 
believe earnings have permanently increased. The reverse of this statement would 
imply  that  dividends  are  only  cut  when  it  is  believed  earnings  are  likely  to  be   17 
depressed for a considerable period. This would suggest that an analysis of unusual 
accounting items in the loss year, for what were previously profitable companies, 
might shed light on the dividend decision. It would be presumed that these are likely 
to be only temporary fluctuations in the long-term profitability of firms (although 
there  is  considerable  debate  as  to just  how  ‘unusual’  some  unusual  items  are  for 
particular firms). 
 
   Table 6 considers two of these unusual accounting items, namely exceptional items 
and extraordinary items. Mean and median figures are presented for each of the items 
in  year  0  ranked  according  to  the  dividend  decision  made  by  the  firm.  Panel  A 
standardizes the values by shareholders’ funds in year 0, while Panel B standardizes 
the values by the absolute amount of the profit for the period (loss) in year 0. A quick 
glance at the median values for the extraordinary items in both Panels A and B reveals 
that  these  are  all  equal  to  0%.  In  fact  there  were  very  few  observations  of 
extraordinary  items  within  the  loss  sample;  only  7  firms  out  of  108  reported 
extraordinary items during the initial loss year. As a result only the exceptional items 
will be discussed from here onwards. 
 
   Panel A of Table 6 shows that there is little difference in terms of the exceptional 
items  between  reducers  and  non-reducers.  The  t-statistic  of  –0.5  is  statistically 
insignificant. When the figures are related to their respective profit values (shown at 
the top of Table 6), it is apparent that the mean exceptional items of non-reducers 
equalling –19.8% are in excess of the profit of –17.2%. It therefore seems likely that 
many of the non-reducers would have been profitable had it not been for the unusual 
items. Exceptional items for dividend reducers however, were –22.6%, some 10% less   18 
than the profit for the period of –32.9%. Thus many of the dividend reducers would 
have posted losses irrespective of unusual items. These findings are consistent with 
the US evidence collected by DeAngelo et al (1992) for special items. 
 
   Panel B of Table 6 shows that the value for exceptional items relative to absolute 
profits is large. They are also considerably greater for non-reducers than reducers at 
414.5% versus 103.8% on a comparison of means. This confirms the results of Panel 
A in that unusual items play a more significant role in the losses of non-reducers than 
for dividend reducing firms. 
 
   Table 7 reports logit regressions of the dividend decisions made by firms in the loss 
sample in year 0 using profits in years –1, 0 and +1 as explanatory variables. As in 
previous regressions, the dependent variable is the dividend decision that takes the 
value  of  zero  if  the  dividend  is  reduced,  and  one  otherwise.  The  specifications 
reported are consistent with DeAngelo et al (1992) except that the only unusual items 
are the exceptional items. 
 
   Despite the inclusion of exceptional items, the size of the loss is still a statistically 
significant factor in the dividend decision in year 0. As with previous models, the 
profits in years –1 and +1 are positively related but not significant. The exceptional 
items are negatively related to dividend cuts in year 0. This is consistent with the view 
that temporary changes in earnings do not cause managers to change dividends. In 
both specifications, however, the unusual items are not found to be significant. A 
comparison based on pseudo R
2 values with Table 5 shows that the specification with 
the dividend decision based on just profits in years –1, 0 and 1 has a value of 12.5%;   19 
the inclusion of the exceptional items increases the pseudo R
2 to 14.5%. There is thus 
some degree of agreement with the findings of Modigliani and Miller (1959) and 
DeAngelo et al (1992) that the inclusion of exceptional items does improve the ability 
to explain dividend decisions compared to profitability alone. 
 
V. The Role of Debt and Sales in Dividend Reductions 
 
   We extend the work of DeAngelo et al (1992) to include other variables that have 
been suggested in the literature as influencing dividends. Debt is one variable that 
would logically appear to be a consideration when managers are making a dividend 
decision. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that for firms with multiple annual 
losses,  debt  covenants  are  a  factor  in  dividend  policy.  Fama  and  French  (2001) 
discover that former payers of dividends are more highly indebted than current payers 
of dividends. Benito and Young (2001) use UK data to show that a high degree of 
leverage is associated with dividend omission. The effect of leverage is even more 
strongly linked to the propensity to cut dividends. They argue that, “dividend cutting 
is a stronger indicator of financial fragility than is dividend omission”. 
 
   Table  8  presents  a  logit  analysis  of  the  dividend  decision  in  year  0  with,  as 
previously, the dependent variable equalling zero if the dividend was cut, and one 
otherwise. Independent variables utilized are the level of profits in years –1 to +2, 
exceptional  items,  and  two  measures  of  debt  available  from  the  FAME  database, 
namely the liquidity ratio and the gearing ratio. The liquidity ratio is a short-term 
measure of debt, calculated as the difference between current assets and stocks & 
works in progress, all divided by current liabilities, i.e. the more indebted the firm is,   20 
the lower the liquidity ratio. For an overall measure of a firm’s debt position, the 
gearing ratio is employed. The gearing ratio is calculated as the sum of short-term 
loans & overdrafts and long-term liabilities, all divided by shareholders’ funds, i.e. the 
more indebted the firms is, the higher the gearing ratio. 
 
   Given the findings in previous models, it comes as no surprise that the size of the 
loss  in  year  0  is  both  positively  related  to  the  dividend  decision  and  statistically 
significant. The liquidity ratio, whilst not significant at the 95% level, does exhibit a 
positive relationship, as hypothesized, in all specifications that it is used. However, it 
provides  only  a  relatively  small  increase  in  the  overall  explanatory  power  of  the 
regression.  Similar  findings  are  observed  for  the  gearing  ratio,  with  negative 
relationships  throughout,  consistent  with  greater  indebtedness  increasing  the 
propensity to cut dividends. There is some evidence here though to support Benito 
and Young’s (2001) conclusion that higher levels of debt increase the probability of a 
dividend cut. 
 
   Studies such as those by Barbee et al (1996) and Leledakis and Davidson (2001) 
have found evidence of higher returns to firms with high sales-to-price ratios (SPR). 
These firms typically have low margins (calculated as the sales for the year divided by 
the profits over the same period) or are loss-making. For example, consider two firms, 
both trading on a multiple of ten times earnings, the first firm has margins of 10% and 
thus has a SPR of 1, the second firm has margins of 2% and thus has a SPR of 5. 
Based on the evidence of previous studies, it might be expected that the second firm 
would return a greater amount in the future. If it were able to raise its margins to the   21 
level  of  the  first  firm  then  it  is  very  likely  that  shareholders  would  experience 
abnormally high returns. 
 
   Table 9 further investigates the ratio of profits to turnover by reworking Table 5 
using  profit  margins  rather  than  profits  standardized  by  shareholders’  funds.  The 
results  show  that  margins  in  years  –1  and  0  are  both  positive  and  statistically 
significant  in  all  specifications  where  the  variables  are  included.  This  seems 
reasonable given that if a firm has demonstrated that it could earn a sizeable margin 
just a year before the loss, it would seem that the dip in profitability is more likely to 
be temporary than a firm with high costs that is only achieving ‘wafer thin’ margins.  
There  is  also  a  positive  coefficient  for  the  margin  in  year  1  although  this  is  not 
significant.  By  year  2  the  margin  variable  has  little  relevance  to  the  model. 
Comparing  the  pseudo  R
2  values  with  the  equivalents  from  Table  5  shows 
considerably greater explanatory power for each specification when using the margin 
variables. 
 
   Table  10  contains  the  same  margin  variables  as  Table  9  but  also  includes  the 
additional explanatory variables used in Table 8. Despite the additional variables, the 
margin coefficients remain positive and statistically significant in both the year prior 
to the loss and the year of the loss itself. The debt variables and the exceptional items 
retain their respective signs from previous regression equations; however they add 
relatively less explanatory power to these models compared to the standard profit 
specifications in Table 8. Overall, the evidence presented in this study shows that 
there is a higher level of risk associated with low margins in the form of an increased 
possibility of a dividend cut. Whether the dividend risk is adequately priced is not a   22 
consideration in this study but it does highlight an issue surrounding high sales-to-
price  stocks.  The  extension  of  the  work  by  DeAngelo  et  al  (1992)  through  the 
incorporation of additional independent variables has increased the ability to explain 
dividend decisions. 
 
VI. The Informational Content of Dividend Policy 
 
   The hypothesis that dividends contain information about future earnings was first 
proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1959) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). It was 
reasoned that if managers raised dividends, this inferred that the future prospects of 
those firms were likely to be better than firms where managers had reduced dividends. 
Watts  (1973)  found,  using  a  random  sample,  a  weakly  positive  relationship  that 
explained little of the variation between dividends and future earnings. Healy and 
Palepu (1988) discovered some evidence consistent with the information hypothesis 
in that firms initiating dividends experienced significant earnings growth in the two 
years following the initiation. Perversely, however, they also report that for firms 
omitting dividends, earnings also increase in the years after omission. Bernatzi et al 
(1997) find only limited support for the information hypothesis. They observe that 
firms that increase dividends show no unexpected earnings growth and that the size of 
the  dividend  increase  is  not  important  either.  Consistent  with  Healy  and  Palepu 
(1988), firms that cut dividends in year 0 show significant increases in earnings in 
year 1. DeAngelo et al (1992) also find similar results to Healy and Palepu (1988) but 
they argue that it is not year-on-year earnings changes that are important but that the 
overall level of earnings of reducers is lower than that of non-reducers. 
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   Table 11 tests whether the inclusion of unusual accounting items and the dividend 
decision  is  able  to  improve  the  ability  to  predict  future  earnings.  The  dependent 
variable in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions is the profit in year 1, and the 
independent  variables  are  the  profits  in  year  0,  exceptional  items  and  a  dividend 
dummy that takes the value of zero if dividends were reduced during the loss year, 
and  one  otherwise.  All  t-statistics  have  been  adjusted  using  the  White  (1980) 
correction. 
 
   Year 0 profits are found to have a positive relationship with year 1 profits but the 
coefficient  is  not  significant  and  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression  is  low. 
Following  the  introduction  of  the  dividend  dummy,  the  adjusted  R
2  value  does 
improve but remains low. The dividend dummy has a positive coefficient in every 
specification, but is only significant in one. Exceptional items do again improve the 
explanatory power of the model by a small increment and the negative coefficient is 
consistent  with unusual items temporarily  lowering profitability, but the  statistical 
significance is low again. Whilst the relationships observed in these regressions are 
consistent with DeAngelo et al (1992), the statistical significance of the variables and 
the explanatory power is much reduced, and thus only qualified corroboration can be 
offered. 
 
   Table 12 uses alternative variables to represent the profitability of the firm in year 0, 
consistent with those of DeAngelo et al (1992). By using variables that are not bottom 
line profits it may provide a more stable estimate of the profitability of the firm, as 
one-off write-downs are not included. It is found from the OLS regressions that the 
operating income provides greater explanatory power as an individual variable than   24 
the profit for the period. Operational cash flow, by contrast, provides less explanatory 
power.  The  dividend  dummy  variable  retains  its  positive  coefficient  across  all 
specifications, although it is not statistically significant in any scenario. A comparison 
of adjusted R
2 values shows that the final specification of Table 11 containing profits 
in year 0, exceptional items and the dividend dummy, with a value of 7.4%, is greater 
than any of the specifications in Table 12. This is consistent with DeAngelo et al 
(1992). 
 
   Table 13 uses the profit and dividend dummy variables from Table 11 but also 
includes the liquidity ratio and the gearing ratio, described in Table 8. It is anticipated 
that  the  higher  the  level  of  debt  that  a  firm  has,  the  lower  future  bottom  line 
profitability will be due to larger interest payments. The OLS regressions show that 
the short-term measure of debt, the liquidity ratio, has very little impact on future 
earnings, regardless of the specification. As in previous models, the dividend dummy 
retains  a  positive  coefficient  but  without  statistical  significance.  By  far  the  most 
important  variable  in  the  specifications  is  the  gearing  ratio,  which  measures  the 
overall indebtedness of the firm. This has a highly significant negative coefficient that 
is consistent with lower gearing (i.e. lower debt) predicting higher future profitability. 
The inclusion of the gearing  variable causes the profit variable to become almost 
entirely irrelevant to the model. It is also noticeable that the specification with the 
greatest explanatory power contains just the gearing ratio and the dividend dummy. 
The adjusted R
2 of this specification is 9.7% and is greater than any of the values 
shown  in  Tables  11  or  12,  although  still  considerably  lower  than  the  best 
specifications of DeAngelo et al (1992). It thus appears that the overall level of debt is 
a factor that affects the future profitability of a firm.   25 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
   It  is  found  that  losses  in  the  UK  are  a  very  important  condition  for  dividend 
reductions in firms that previously had long track records of positive earnings and 
dividends. Around 29% of firms in the loss sample cut dividends in the initial loss 
year,  whilst  only  2%  of  firms  in  the  non-loss  sample  reduced  their  dividends. 
Dividend  omissions  are  almost  entirely  confined  to  firms  posting  losses. 
Approximately 10% of the loss sample omitted dividends in the first loss year; by 
contrast there was just one incidence of omission amongst 1130 firm years in the non-
loss  sample.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  those  for  the  US  reported  by 
DeAngelo et al (1992), although they find a higher level of dividend cutting within 
the loss sample at around 50% of all firms. The lower propensity to reduce dividends 
in  the  UK  relative  to  the  US  is  consistent  with  the  stronger  culture  of  dividend 
payments. 
 
   Although losses were found to be important in dividend reductions, over two-thirds 
of firms that posted an initial loss did not cut their dividends. Other variables were 
thus  also  investigated  in  an  attempt  to  improve  the  ability  to  explain  managers’ 
dividend decisions. It is found that the size of the loss plays an important factor in the 
decision to reduce dividends, although the greater the exceptional items in the year of 
the loss, the lower the probability of a dividend reduction. This inferred that managers 
viewed unusual accounting items as being consistent with merely a temporary decline 
in profitability. 
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   Evidence demonstrated that the more heavily indebted a firm was, the greater the 
propensity  to  reduce  dividends  during  the  initial  loss  year.  This  supports  the  US 
findings of Fama and French (2001) and the UK  results presented by Benito and 
Young (2001). Finally, profit margins were also considered in the dividend decision. 
These were observed to have very significant explanatory power in both the year of 
the loss and the year preceding the loss, with lower margins increasing the likelihood 
of a dividend reduction. Indeed, margins were found to provide a better explanation of 
the  dividend  decision  than  the  equivalent  profit  measures  standardized  by 
shareholders’ funds. 
 
   Dividend reductions were discovered to be consistent with lower future earnings 
compared  to  non-reducers,  although  the  statistical  significance  of  the  results  was 
found to be less than that reported by DeAngelo et al (1992). There was also evidence 
though of the rebound in profitability in the years after a dividend cut as previously 
described by Healy and Palepu (1988) and Bernatzi et al (1997). Exceptional items 
were  observed  as  being  negatively  related  to  future  earnings,  albeit  with  little 
explanatory power, consistent with these unusual items being of a temporary nature. 
Finally,  the  overall  indebtedness  of  a  firm  was  found  to  be  very  significant  in 
predicting the level of future profits. Higher debt levels led to lower profitability in 
future periods. 
   27 
Notes 
 
   1. At the time of writing, the dividend yield on the US S&P 500 Index was around 
1.5% compared to a yield of just over 3% on the UK FT-SE All Share Index 
 
   2. Prior to the Finance Act 1997, all tax-exempt investors were able to reclaim the 
dividend tax credit paid on their behalf by firms. After 2
nd July 1997, pension funds 
and  institutions  were  no  longer  allowed  to  reclaim  the  credit  although  individual 
investors still could. The Finance Act 1999, introduced on 6
th April 1999, however 
virtually eliminated this and as such all dividends have subsequently been received 
net of tax. 
 
   3. All pseudo R
2 values are calculated using Estella (1998).   28 
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Table 1 
Incidence of Reduction in Regular Dividends for (1) 108 Firms With at Least 
One Annual Loss During 1996-2000, and (2) 289 Firms With Positive Earnings 
Throughout 1996-2000 
 
Each dividend reduction was first identified from LSPD and then checked against the annual report of 
each individual firm using LexisNexis. The dividend reduction count includes both dividend cuts to a 
still-positive level and also omissions. Omissions are classed as no dividend payments throughout the 
entire financial year of the individual firm (both interim and final). There were nine observations 
amongst loss firms of dividend reductions where an interim dividend was paid but the final dividend 
was omitted. For the 108 firms in the loss sample, the dividend reductions are for the initial loss year 
1996-2000. For the 289 firms in the non-loss sample all incidences of dividend reductions are reported 
during 1996-2000 (beginning with the first year that the firm had positive dividends and earnings for 
the prior seven years). The 25 reductions in this sample were for 21 different firms. A loss is defined as 
a negative profit for the year in question after exceptional items, interest, taxation, extraordinary items 
and minority interests, but excluding dividends. 
 
  Number (Percent) of Cases With 
 
Number of Firm-
Years  Dividend Reductions  Dividend Omissions 
Loss Firms  108  31  11 
    (28.7%)  (10.2%) 
1131  25  1  Non-Loss Firm 
Years    (2.2%)  (<0.1%)   33 
Table 2 
Incidence of Dividend Reductions According to Return on Equity: Pooled 
Sample of (1) 108 Initial Loss Years During 1996-2000 for the 108 Firms in the 
Loss Sample and (2) 1,131 Firm-Years During 1996-2000 for the 289 Firms in 
the Non-Loss Sample 
 
Each dividend reduction was first identified from LSPD and then checked against the annual report of 
each individual firm using LexisNexis. The return on equity is calculated as the profit for the period 
standardized by shareholders’ funds for the previous year. The table shows the proportion of firm years 
in which a reduction occurred, i.e. in 43.6% of the years where ROE < -20% a dividend reduction was 
recorded. 
 
Return on Equity  No. of Reductions  Percent of Category  Total Firm-Years 
-20% or lower  17  43.6%  39 
-20% to -10%  5  21.7%  23 
-10% to -5%  3  21.4%  14 
-5% to 0%  6  18.8%  32 
       
0% to 5%  4  7.4%  54 
5% to 10%  9  5.0%  180 
10% to 20%  9  2.2%  409 
20% or greater  3  0.6%  488   34 
Table 3 
Logit Analysis of the Decision to Reduce Dividends for Pooled Sample of (1) 108 
Firms With at Least One Annual Loss During 1996-2000, and (2) 206 Firms with 
at Least One Year of Declining Profits, but Remaining Positive Throughout 
1996-2000. 
 
The dependent variable equals zero if the firm announced a reduction in its regular dividend, and one 
otherwise. The loss dummy equals one if the firm reports a loss in the year under study, and zero 
otherwise. The profit for the period and the change in profit are standardized by the value of 
shareholders’ funds in the prior year. For firms in the loss sample, the event year is the first year during 
1996-2000 that the firm reported a loss. For firms in the non-loss sample, the event year is the first year 
during 1996-2000 that the firm reported a decline in profit. Firms are only eligible for either of the 
samples if they have at least seven years of positive dividends and earnings prior to the event year. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  4.62 
(6.51)** 
4.65 
(6.06)** 
4.85 
(6.59)** 
4.51 
(5.46)** 
2.08 
(4.80)** 
2.38 
(10.89)** 
2.84 
(10.70)** 
Loss 
Dummy 
-3.72 
(-5.01)** 
-3.36 
(-4.29)** 
-3.37 
(-4.47)** 
-3.46 
(-4.17)**  -  -  - 
Profit For 
Period 
-  1.63 
(2.92)**  -  2.80 
(1.51) 
5.39 
(2.17)* 
3.58 
(5.19)**  - 
Change 
in Profit 
-  -  1.58 
(2.29)* 
-1.43 
(-0.67) 
-1.95 
(-0.77)  -  2.93 
(4.70)** 
Pseudo 
R
2 
19.8%  22.3%  21.5%  22.4%  11.6%  11.3%  7.9% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level   35 
 
Table 4 
Average Standardized Earnings for 108 Firms with an Initial Loss Year 
During 1996-2000 by Dividend Policy 
 
Standardized earnings in year t are the level of profit for that period divided by shareholders’ funds 
in year – 1. The sample is restricted to firms with at least 7 years positive dividends and earnings 
prior to the initial loss year during 1996-2000. There are 108 observations in years –1 and 0 (31 
reducers and 77 non-reducers). This declines to 104 observations in year 1 (30 reducers and 74 non-
reducers) and 97 in year 2 (30 reducers and 67 non-reducers) due to delistings. 
 
  Mean and Median Standardized Earnings 
for 
 
Year Relative to Initial 
Loss in Year t = 0 
Dividend Reducers  Non-Reducers  t-statistic 
- 1  10.9%  13.3%  -1.61 
  9.1%  12.1%   
       
0  -32.9%  -17.2%  -2.70* 
  -25.0%  -10.9%   
       
1  -5.5%  6.1%  -2.03* 
  1.1%  11.1%   
       
2  -0.0%  8.4%  -2.05* 
  1.9%  5.3%   
N.B. * denotes significant at 95% level   36 
Table 5 
Logit Analysis of the Decision to Reduce Dividends During an Initial Loss Year 
Following Seven or More Years of Positive Dividends and Earnings. 
 
The dependent variable has a value of zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, 
and one otherwise. Year 0 is defined as the time of the firm’s initial loss during 1996-2000. PFP(t) 
refers to the profit for the period of year t standardized by the value of shareholders funds in year –1. 
There are 108 observations in years –1 and 0 (31 reducers and 77 non-reducers). This declines to 104 
observations in year 1 (30 reducers and 74 non-reducers) and 97 in year 2 (30 reducers and 67 non-
reducers) due to delistings. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  0.31 
(0.73) 
0.82 
(1.68) 
0.62 
(1.24) 
0.72 
(1.36) 
PFP(-1)  4.92 
(1.49) 
6.25 
(1.73) 
6.54 
(1.82) 
5.50 
(1.41) 
PFP(0)  -  2.73 
(2.96)** 
2.27 
(2.30)* 
2.95 
(2.70)** 
PFP(1)  -  -  1.50 
(1.61) 
0.67 
(0.59) 
PFP(2)  -  -  -  1.51 
(1.04) 
Pseudo R
2  2.3%  11.3%  12.5%  15.5% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level 
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Table 6 
Unusual Income Items for 108 Firms with an Initial Loss Year During 1996-
2000 by Dividend Policy 
 
The profit for the period in year t is the level of profit for that period divided by shareholders’ funds 
in year – 1. Exceptional and extraordinary items are standardized by the value of shareholders’ funds 
in year –1 (Panel A) or the absolute value of the profit for the period in year 0 (Panel B). The sample 
is restricted to firms with at least 7 years positive dividends and earnings prior to the initial loss year 
during 1996-2000. There are 108 observations in years –1 and 0 (31 reducers and 77 non-reducers). 
This declines to 104 observations in year 1 (30 reducers and 74 non-reducers) and 97 in year 2 (30 
reducers and 67 non-reducers) due to delistings. 
 
  Mean and Median Values for   
  Dividend Reducers  Non-Reducers  t-statistic 
Profit for Period  -32.9%  -17.2%  -2.70* 
  -25.0%  -10.9%   
Panel A: Unusual Income Items Standardized by Shareholders’ funds 
Exceptional Items  -22.6%  -19.8%  -0.50 
  -13.8%  -12.7%   
       
Extraordinary Items  0.2%  -2.6%  1.60 
  0.0%  0.0%   
Panel B: Unusual Income Items Standardized by Absolute Value of Earnings 
Exceptional Items  -103.8%  -414.5%  1.88 
  -54.8%  -113.7%   
       
Extraordinary Items  -7.1%  -9.9%  -0.28 
  0.0%  0.0%   
N.B. * denotes significant at 95% level 
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Table 7 
The Impact of Unusual Items and Earnings on the Decision to Reduce Dividends 
by Firms with an Initial Loss During 1996-2000 Following Seven or More Years 
of Positive Dividends and Earnings 
 
The dependent variable has a value of zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, 
and one otherwise. Year 0 is defined as the time of the firm’s initial loss during 1996-2000. PFP(t) 
refers to the profit for the period of year t standardized by the value of shareholders funds in year –1. 
Exceptional items are standardized by the value of shareholders’ funds in year –1. There are 108 
observations in years –1 and 0 (31 reducers and 77 non-reducers). This declines to 104 observations in 
year 1 (30 reducers and 74 non-reducers). 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  0.92 
(1.86) 
0.74 
(1.46) 
PFP(-1)  4.78 
(1.32) 
5.04 
(1.38) 
PFP(0)  4.84 
(2.72)** 
4.21 
(2.26)* 
PFP(1)  -  1.15 
(1.21) 
Exceptional Items  -2.52 
(-1.57) 
-2.35 
(-1.40) 
Pseudo R
2  13.9%  14.5% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level   39 
Table 8 
Logit Analysis of the Decision to Reduce Dividends During an Initial Loss Year 
Following Seven or More Years of Positive Dividends and Earnings using 
Profitability, Debt Variables, Exceptional Items and Change in Turnover. 
 
The dependent variable has a value of zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, 
and one otherwise. Year 0 is defined as the time of the firm’s initial loss during 1996-2000. PFP(t) 
refers to the profit for the period of year t standardized by the value of shareholders funds in year –1. 
The liquidity ratio is defined as the difference between current assets minus the value of stocks & work 
in progress all divided by current liabilities. The gearing ratio is defined as the sum of short-term loans 
& overdrafts and long-term liabilities all divided by shareholders’ funds (both ratios take values only 
from year 0). Exceptional items are standardized by the value of shareholders’ funds in year –1. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  -0.12 
(-0.15) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.85 
(1.56) 
0.37 
(0.39) 
PFP(-1)  5.30 
(1.33) 
7.66 
(1.70) 
3.79 
(0.93) 
4.91 
(1.04) 
PFP(0)  2.69 
(2.43)* 
3.54 
(2.67)** 
4.61 
(2.45)* 
8.94 
(3.07)** 
PFP(1)  0.63 
(0.56) 
0.44 
(0.34) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
-0.05 
(-0.04) 
PFP(2)  1.49 
(1.04) 
0.97 
(0.34) 
1.74 
(1.17) 
1.17 
(0.75) 
Liquidity Ratio 
 
0.90 
(1.17) 
0.75 
(0.94) 
-  0.80 
(0.95) 
Gearing Ratio 
 
-  -0.28 
(-0.67) 
-  -0.17 
(-0.36) 
Exceptional 
Items 
-  -  -2.11 
(-1.24) 
-5.27 
(-2.32)* 
Pseudo R
2  17.9%  20.1%  17.2%  26.5% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level 
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Table 9 
Logit Analysis of the Decision to Reduce Dividends During an Initial Loss Year 
Following Seven or More Years of Positive Dividends and Earnings using 
Margin Variables. 
 
The dependent variable has a value of zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, 
and one otherwise. Year 0 is defined as the time of the firm’s initial loss during 1996-2000. The margin 
in year t is the profit of the period in year t divided by the turnover of the firm in the same year. There 
are 108 observations in years –1 and 0 (31 reducers and 77 non-reducers). This declines to 104 
observations in year 1 (30 reducers and 74 non-reducers) and 97 in year 2 (30 reducers and 67 non-
reducers) due to delistings. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  -0.37 
(-0.81) 
0.12 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
MGN(-1)  0.33 
(2.88)* 
0.38 
(3.14)** 
0.33 
(2.78)** 
0.37 
(2.94)** 
MGN (0)  -  0.09 
(2.76)** 
0.08 
(2.36)* 
0.10 
(2.56)* 
MGN (1)  -  -  0.06 
(1.84) 
0.06 
(1.45) 
MGN (2)  -  -  -  -0.01 
(-0.20) 
Pseudo R
2  11.0%  18.5%  20.2%  23.3% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level   41 
Table 10 
Logit Analysis of the Decision to Reduce Dividends During an Initial Loss Year 
Following Seven or More Years of Positive Dividends and Earnings using 
Margin Variables, Debt Variables and Exceptional Items. 
 
The dependent variable has a value of zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, 
and one otherwise. Year 0 is defined as the time of the firm’s initial loss during 1996-2000. The margin 
in year t is the profit of the period in year t divided by the turnover of the firm in the same year. The 
liquidity ratio is defined as the difference between current assets minus the value of stocks & work in 
progress all divided by current liabilities. The gearing ratio is defined as the sum of short-term loans & 
overdrafts and long-term liabilities all divided by shareholders’ funds (both ratios take values only 
from year 0). Exceptional items are standardized by the value of shareholders’ funds in year –1.  
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  -0.56 
(-0.64) 
-0.33 
(-0.33) 
-0.63 
(-0.73) 
0.17 
(0.28) 
-0.08 
(-0.12) 
-0.42 
(-0.41) 
MGN(-1)  0.35 
(2.78)** 
0.39 
(2.90)** 
0.37 
(2.87)** 
0.41 
(2.99)** 
0.46 
(3.18)** 
0.45 
(3.08)** 
MGN (0)  0.09 
(2.40)* 
0.11 
(2.64)** 
0.12 
(2.45)* 
0.12 
(2.72)** 
0.17 
(2.92)** 
0.16 
(2.81)** 
MGN (1)  0.06 
(1.41) 
0.05 
(1.16) 
0.06 
(1.41) 
0.05 
(1.15) 
0.05 
(1.21) 
0.05 
(1.22) 
MGN (2)  -0.01 
(-0.17) 
-0.01 
(-0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.02 
(-0.62) 
-0.02 
(-0.61) 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
0.69 
(0.78) 
0.57 
(0.62) 
0.58 
(0.66) 
-  -  0.39 
(0.43) 
Gearing 
Ratio 
-  -0.20 
(-0.58) 
-  -0.24 
(-0.68) 
-0.29 
(-0.73) 
-0.26 
(-0.65) 
Exceptional 
Items 
-  -  -1.26 
(-0.98) 
-  -2.15 
(-1.54) 
-2.07 
(-1.48) 
Pseudo R
2  23.9%  25.7%  24.9%  25.3%  27.9%  28.0% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level   42 
Table 11 
OLS Regressions of Future Earnings on Current Earnings, Exceptional Items 
and Changes in Dividends for Firms with an Initial Loss During 1996-2000. 
 
The profit for the period and exceptional items in year 0 are standardized by shareholders’ funds in 
year –1. The dependent variable is the profit for the period in year 1 is also standardized by 
shareholders’ funds in year –1. The dividend dummy has a value of zero if the firm reduced its 
dividend during the initial loss year, and one otherwise. The sample is reduced to 104 observations 
since three firms were lost from the sample in year 1. All t-statistics have been adjusted using the 
White (1980) correction. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  0.08 
(2.30)* 
0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(-1.25) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
PFP(0)  0.23 
(1.55) 
0.18 
(1.32)  -  0.36 
(1.79) 
Exceptional Items  -  -  -0.04 
(-0.28) 
-0.26 
(-1.31) 
Dividend Dummy  -  0.09 
(1.85) 
0.12 
(2.07)* 
0.07 
(1.25) 
Adjusted R
2  3.4%  4.8%  2.3%  7.4% 
N.B. * denotes significant at 95% level 
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Table 12 
OLS Regressions of Future Earnings on Current Operating Income, Operating 
Cash Flow and Changes in Dividends for Firms with an Initial Loss During 
1996-2000. 
 
Current operating income and current operating cash flow are values for year 0, standardized by 
shareholders’ funds in year –1. The dependent variable is the profit for the period in year 1 is also 
standardized by shareholders’ funds in year –1. The dividend dummy has a value of zero if the firm 
reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, and one otherwise.  The sample is reduced to 104 
observations since three firms were lost from the sample in year 1. All t-statistics have been adjusted 
using the White (1980) correction. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(-0.87) 
-0.03 
(-0.56) 
-0.08 
(-1.32) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
Current Operating Income  0.29 
(1.50) 
0.24 
(1.14)  -  -  0.32 
(1.50) 
0.27 
(1.16) 
Current Operating Cash 
Flow  -  -  0.21 
(1.09) 
0.15 
(0.78) 
-0.04 
(-0.20) 
-0.05 
(-0.24) 
Dividend Dummy  -  0.06 
(1.02)  -  0.09 
(1.86)  -  0.06 
(1.05) 
Adjusted R
2  6.1%  6.2%  2.3%  3.7%  5.2%  5.4% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level   44 
Table 13 
OLS Regressions of Future Earnings on Current Earnings, Liquidity Ratio, 
Gearing Ratio and Changes in Dividends for Firms with an Initial Loss During 
1996-2000. 
 
The profit for the period and exceptional items in year 0 are standardized by shareholders’ funds in 
year –1. The dependent variable is the profit for the period in year 1 is also standardized by 
shareholders’ funds in year –1. The liquidity ratio is defined as the difference between current assets 
minus the value of stocks & work in progress all divided by current liabilities. The gearing ratio is 
defined as the sum of short-term loans & overdrafts and long-term liabilities all divided by 
shareholders’ funds (both ratios take values only from year 0). The dividend dummy has a value of 
zero if the firm reduced its dividend during the initial loss year, and one otherwise. The sample is 
reduced to 106 firms in some instances since data for the gearing ratio was unavailable for two firms. 
The t-statistics in the first specification have been adjusted using the White (1980) correction; this was 
not necessary for the remaining specifications. 
 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant  0.07 
(1.97)* 
-0.06 
(-1.20) 
0.12 
(3.18)** 
0.06 
(1.21) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
PFPB0  0.23 
(1.52)  -  0.03 
(0.28)  -  0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
0.00 
(0.86) 
0.00 
(0.28)  -  -  -  -0.00 
(-0.19) 
Gearing 
Ratio  -  -  -0.09 
(-3.12)** 
-0.09 
(-3.14)** 
-0.09 
(-2.99)** 
-0.09 
(-2.98)** 
Dividend 
Dummy  -  0.11 
(2.04)*  -  0.06 
(1.13) 
0.06 
(1.08) 
0.06 
(1.08) 
Number of 
Observations  108  108  106  106  106  106 
Adjusted R
2  2.6%  2.3%  8.6%  9.7%  8.8%  7.9% 
N.B. ** denotes significant at 99% level  
         * denotes significant at 95% level 
 